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"AND TO DECLARE AN EMERGENCY"
The Initiative and Referendum is a comparatively recent innovation in
American government. Within the last fifty years, it has been incorporated
into the constitutions of a considerable number of the states. The Initiative
and Referendum provides for direct legislation, i.e., legislation by the voters
themselves. The typical provisions allow for the initiation of a bill by securing
the signatures of a certain epr cent (3% to io%) of the voters of the state
or of the voters at the last gubernatorial election. After the required number
of signatures is filed, the bill is placed on the ballot for a referendum vote.
For passage, some states require that the bill receive a majority of the votes
cast on the question of the bill itself, and other states require that the bill
receive a majority of the total votes cast at the election. Also, the referendum
may be used alone to place before the voters bills which have already been
passed by the legislature and signed by the governor. Such a bill will be placed
on the ballot for ratification if a sufficient number of voters petition for such
referendum within a specified time after the passage of the bill.
However, not all bills are subject to the referendum. In particular,
"emergency laws" are exempt, and to the extent that "emergency laws" are
passed, the right of the people to have a referendum on unpopular legislation
is limited. It is with this use of the referendum by the voters and the use of
the "emergency laws" by the legislature that we are here concerned.
The Initiative and Referendum amendment to the Ohio Constitution
was made a part of the fundamental law of our state along with other major
amendments in i91z. Its provisions as to the time at which laws will take
effect are as follows:
ART. II
Sec. ic-Irsniative and Referendum- . . . . "no law passed by the General
Assembly shall go into effect until ninety days after it shall have been filed by the gov-
ernor in the office of the secretary of state," except ....
Sec. id-nitiative and Referendum-"Laws providing for tax levies, appropria-
tions for the current expenses of the state government and state institutions, and emer-
gency laws necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and
safety, shall go into immediate effect. Such emergency laws, upon a yea and nay vote
must receive a vote of two-thirds of all members elected to each branch of the general
assembly, and the reasons for such necessity shall be set forth in one section of the
law, which section shall be passed only upon a yea and nay vote, upon a separate role
call thereon. The laws mentioned in this section shall not be subject to referendum."
(adopted Sept. 3, 1912-)
The ninety-day clause was inserted to afford the voters a chance to circulate
petitions to procure a referendum. The other clause automatically places cer-
tain measures beyond the reach of the referendum and allows the legislature
to do the same in other cases where a situation arises that demands immediate
action.
It would seem that the provision making tax and appropriation measures
immune from the referendum and the provision allowing for the passage of
emergency legislation to avoid the ninety-day postponement of taking effect
are sensible and practical and necessary for expediting the business of legisla-
tion. It is just as apparent that both these provisions are definite inroads on
the power of the people to legislate directly.
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It has been up to the courts to say whether or not the legislatures, under
the constitutional proivsions, shall have a free hand in declaring emergencies.
Is there any check on their power to declare emergencies?
i. The statement of an emergency by the legislature is conclusive.
ARKANSAS
Hanson v. Hodges-iog Ark. 4791 16o S.W. 395. (1913)
Emergency . . . "is a question exclusively for legislative determination . . .
COLORADO
VanKleeck v. Ramer-6z Colo. 4; 156 Pac. iIo8. (ii6)
Declaration of emergency is conclusive and not reviewable by the court . . .
"in so far as it abridges the right to invoke the referendum."
ILLINOIS
Wheeler v. Chubuck-x6 Ill. 36z. ((z855)
"The general assembly is the sole judge of the emergency." But the assembly
must make the statement of the emergency unequivocal.
Murray v. Holmes-34z IIL 23; 173 N.E. 145. (1930)
The court, in effect reversed the earlier Illinois decision, for without any state-
ment of policy, they weighed the emergency and found that it was not Sufficient.
INDIANA
Hendrickson v. Hendrickson-7 Ind. 13. (a88S)
The court merely said that the statement that a law should take effect sooner that
the ordinary time was not a declaration of an emergency.
Mark v. State--x 5 Ind. 98. (s86o)
The act contained no declaration of emergency, and thus it did not go into
effect until the other laws of that session. However, a declaration of emergency
would have been sufficient to accomplish this.
NZZRA$KA
State v. Pacific Express Co.-8o Neb. 823; iiS N.W. 61g. (19o8)
Merely saying that this shall take effect "on and after its approval" does not
declare an emergency so that it will take effect immediately.
OKLAHOMA
Oklahoma City v. Shields-2zz Okla. 365; 97 Pac. 1014. (ago8)
"It is a question of which the legislature must be the judge, and when it decides
the fact to exist, its action is final."
ORzGoN (leading state)
Biggs v. McBride--17 Ore. 640; z Pac. 878. (i889)
The statement of emergency-giving law effect at the time of its passage is con-
clusive on the courts.
Kadderly v. Portland-4. Ore. ii8s 74 Pac. 710. (19o3)
"Question whether a given law . . . may be put into operation by adding an
emergency clause is distinctly for the legislature . . . and not judicially re-
viewable."
Sears v. Multnomah County-49 Ore. 42; 88 Pac. 522. (1907)
The court held that the emergency clause failed, for the legislature had not
stated that it was necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace,
health and safety. But if the legislature had made this statement, the court
would not have investigated.
SOUTH DAOTA
State v. Levan-14 S. D. 394; 85 N.W. 6oS. (z9os)
"It seems to have been uniformly held under constitutions containing an emer-
gency clause and providing that laws containing such a clause shall take effect
as therein directed and that the action of the legislature is conclusive on the
courts."
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State v. Whisman-36 S. D. 26o; 154 N.W. 707. (1916)
The court stated that it would declare the emergency clause void if it found that
there was clearly no emergency. Otherwise, the decision of the legislature was
final.
TExAs
Day Land and Cattle Co. State-68 Tex. Sz65 4 S.W. 86S. (x887)
"If the legislature states facts or reasons which in its judgement authorize the
suspension of a rule and the immediate passage of a bill, the courts certainly
have no powr to re-examine that question and declare that the legislature came
to an erroneous conclusion."
Keaton v. Whittaker--xo4 Tex. 628; 143 SAV. 607. (1912)
The Supreme Court simply refused to consider whether or not it had the power
to investigate the emergency clause. It accepted the legislature's statement.
2. The legislature's statement of an emergency is not conclusive nor binding
on the courts.
CALIFORNIA
McClure v. Nye-z2 Cal. App. 248; 133 Pac. 1145. (1913)
The court decided that certain appropriations were "unusual" and thus could not
go into effect immediately to avoid a referendum.
MICHIGAN
Naudzius v. Lahr-253 Mich. 216i 234 N.W. 581. (193x)
The court demanded only "real or substantial relation to the public health, etc.
" and in case that existed "all doubt vill be resolved in favor of legis-
lative judgement that it is immediately necessary." However, they held that the
legislative word was not the last word.
MONTANA
State v. Stewart-57 Mont. 144; 187 Pac. 64.1. (igig)
"Statement by legislature that emergency exists and that the act passed is neces-
sary to the preservation of peace," etc. . . . "is not conclusive."
WASHINGTON
State v. Meath-84 Wash. 3oz; 47 Pac. 11. (19TS)
"Constitution says that no special law shall be passed where a general law can
be made applicable" . . . and "courts will review" . . . legislation to
see if this idea has been violated.
State v. Howell-8 Wash. 294; 147 Pac. 1i59. (igg)
Doubt as to the existence of an emergency will be resolved in favor of the legis-
lative determination.
We see, from these holdings, that some of the courts, led by Oregon, have left
the question of whether or not a law should be withdrawn from the class of
laws on which a referendum vote may be held, entirely to the discretion of the
legislature. Other courts, led by Washington, have taken it upon themselves
to decide this question.
It might be interesting to consider the merits of these two views briefly
in relation to: (I) intent of the amendments; (z) possible abuse of the right
by the public; (3) possible abuse by the legislature of the power to declare
emergencies.
First: It would seem safe to say that the amendments were intended to
check the action of the legislature except in cases where such check would be
unwise. The difficulty arises when we try to decide what was intended to be
included in the exceptions, "emergency laws necessary for the immediate
preservation of the public peace, health and safety." The requirement "imme-
diate preservation" would seem to call for the most urgent and serious demand
for legislation. The provision was not to allow the legislature to set aside the
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referendum but to make the referendum step aside when it interfered with
the proper control of extraordinary situations which might arise.
Second: The probability of abuse by the voters is unlikely. Getting the
required number of signatures to petitions is difficult. The stationary inertia
of the voters is so great that even the use of the referendum is an event.
Third: The abuse of the power to nullify the right of referendum is
limited by the requirement of a two-thirds vote of the membership of both
houses of the assembly on the whole bill as well as on the section stating the
emergency separately. (The details of this provision vary from state to state).
This requirement might appear to be an adequate safeguard, but the fact that,
during the 1933 and 1934. sessions of the Ohio State Assembly, of the some
two hundred and ninety-five bills that were passed, one hundred and thirteen
declared emergencies, gives rise to a doubt as to the preventative efficiency of
the two-thirds requirement as a check on the legislature's abuse.
Ohio has taken its stand behind Oregon, and the attitude which the court
will take seems settled although the leading case was decided by a four-to-
three decision and only after much controversy.
The first case in which the court mentioned the conclusiveness of the
decision of the legislative statement was Miami County v. Dayton which was
consolidated with State, ex Rd. Duncan v. Franklin County, 9z Ohio St. 2 15;
x1o N. E. 726 (915). The court pointed to the question underlying the
controversy in saying:
Evidently, the sole purpose of the constitutional requirement of a two-thirds major-
ity in emergency measures was for the purpose of withdrawing such measures from the
referendum provisions.
The only declaration made by the court in deciding the case which bears on
the question was that the court would investigate the records to see if the
constitutional requirement of a two-thirds vote had been met in passing the
emergency provision, and if it had not, the act would go into effect at the
end of the regular period. However, Judge Wanamaker made the following
statement, which was not necessary to the decision of the case:
Manifestly, the legislature's judgement in that behalf, (referring to the deciding
as to the emergency) as shown by the act itself and the records touching the same, is not
conclusive.
The enthusiasm with which Judge Wanamaker's statement was received
at the time State, ex Rel. Durbin v. Smith, io2 Ohio St. 591; 133 N. E. 457
(:92:) was decided is evidenced by the statement in the opinion of that case
relating to the conclusiveness of the legislative statement of an emergency:
No case has previously been presented to this court involving that question.
The court entirely disregarded the Miami County case, and started out anew.
The majority opinion depended on Kadderly v. Portland (supra) saying that
the Ohio Initiative and Referendum provision was copied from Oregon's. The
majority laid down this rule:
Manifestly, this court cannot go outside of the provisions of the act and the facts
which it judicially knows for the purpose of ascertaining whether the legislature had
valid reasons for declaring this to be an emergency law.
The result of such an opinion was to place the use of the Initiative and
Referendum under the control of the legislature.
Chief Justice Marshall led the dissent with an opinion in which he cited
State v. Meaths (supra) agreeing that the constitution did not intend to allow
the legislature to declare an emergency where none existed. He quoted State
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v. Stewart (supra) saying that the constitutional convention "did not intend
that the exception should extend further than to those matters arising out of
some unforeseen menace, public calamity, sudden emergency, extraordinary
occurrence or unprecedented climatic condition." After thus setting out his
requirements for an emergency, he said:
Provisions of the act must be such as are necessary to immediately avert threatened
danger.
He evidently thought that the emergency clause was inserted, not to
make possible the defeat of the referendum, but to allow for quick legislative
action when an imperative situation required it. Any other attitude seemed
to him to defeat the purpose of the amendment, and so, he felt that the final
decision of the necessity and propriety of the emergency law should be left
up to the Supreme Court.
Judge Johnson and Judge Wanamaker dissented in separate opinions.
Judge Wanamaker observed that the term "emergency,' was nowhere defined,
and he felt that it was the right and duty of the court to establish this
definition.
The Supreme Court refused a motion to certify in the case of Menke v.
Jackson, No. 19536, March x6, 1926, which is reported in 4 Ohio Abstracts
at p. 59. In this case, the city council of Garfield Heights, under Sec.
4227-3, General Code, had passed an emergency measure raising the salary
of the mayor. The plaintiff sought to have the payment of the salary
restrained because the ordinance was not an emergency measure within the
meaning of the law. On the authority of the Durbin Case, the common pleas
judge had sustained a demurrer to the petition stating that the court was
without jurisdiction.
In x929, a trial judge refused to follow the Durbin case. In Burns v.
City of Marietta, 27 0. N. P. (N. S.) 497, the court refused to follow the
majority opinion of the Durbin case but felt that the law was to be found
in Judge Wanamaker's dissent.
The judgement of the general assembly as to the emergency character of an act
under the constitutional amendment of 1912 is not conclusive, but its judgement in that
behalf may be challenged in a proper proceeding at any day within the go day limit,
either as to the constitutional vote or the emergency character of the act.
This statement was taken from Wanamaker's opinion in the case of
Miami County v. Dayton (supra). The basis on which the trial judge decided
that this was the law of Ohio was that it was disclosed in the dissent to the
Durbin case that the majority opinion was a compromise decision, and that
there were only two judges in favor of the pronouncement that the determina-
tion of the legislature should be final, whereas, in the Miami County v. Dayton
case, all judges concurred in the statement of law quoted by Judge Wana-
maker. This attitude seems more nearly to follow the intent of the con-
stitution.
In the final analysis, the problem resolves itself into a consideration of
the relative merits of (r) judgment by two-thirds of the members of the
legislature coupled with the likelihood of the disappearance of the use of the
referendum and (2) judgment by the supreme court as to the existence of an
emergency coupled with the possibility of continued existence of the refer-
endum as a check on the legislature. The choice is a purely personal one.
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